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“De kiezers, 2/3 van de Nederlanders, hebben gezegd een missie niet te zien zitten. Waar 
haalt men de arrogantie vandaan om dan te zeggen toch te gaan. Iedere geloofwaardigheid, 
dat de kamer(s) de kiezers vertegenwoordigen is nu zeker verdwenen.” (Truus, cited in Van 
der Meulen & Vos, 2012, p.1). 
 
 
 
“[T]o Hell with public opinion... . We should lead not follow.” (US State Department Official 
cited in Aldrich, et al., 2006, p.491). 
  
 
 
PREFACE 
 
I did it! After a long and difficult journey it feels good to look back. Why I cannot make it myself easy? 
I could work half-days, party every week and submit a thesis that would be just enough to pass, like 
that it would already feel like holidays. I guess, this is just not who I am. I wanted more. The most 
interesting way was not the easiest however. This first time to do research brought a lot of 
challenges with it. Furthermore, to do research is one thing, to write it down in an understandable 
way is another… ‘Laugh, sweat and tears’ is perhaps the best description of the process. I had to be 
like the soldiers on the cover, to work hard with an iron discipline, and I had to be like politicians as 
well, to carefully weight my decisions to make the right choices.  
In the end, it was worth it. It was a great journey. I learned a lot because all I discovered was 
really interesting. The most interesting was to see the story of both sides, from official documents as 
well as from former politicians themselves. I am proud with this thesis as result. Thanks to my family 
and friends who gave their support. Thanks to my supervisor, Dr. Michael Meffert, as well for his 
advice.  
With this thesis my adventure of three years International relations & Organizations at the 
University of Leiden comes to an end. I think I can look back happily and satisfied on those three 
years and I already look forward to what the future might bring. First, I will enjoy a well-deserved 
holiday. 
 
Pieter de Wit 
Leiden, June 12, 2017 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
The Dutch mission to Uruzgan was perhaps the most dangerous military operation since 
World War II (Hazelbag, 2009, p.251).  Besides, it was a ‘very disputable’ decision (Jockel, 
2014, p.4). Recently, the debate evolved about the results after the Dutch soldiers left 
Uruzgan in 2010 (for instance: Trouw, 2016; De Correspondent, 2017; Ministry of Defense, 
2016). Before the mission started in August 2006, opinions were already mixed. In different 
newspapers the mission was portrayed as either a ‘fighting mission’ or a ‘reconstruction 
mission’ and this was something where the political debate was shaped by ever since 
(Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2016, p.12).  
With these debates and the mixed results in Uruzgan the question arises how this 
decision was made. On February 2, 2006 the Second Chamber in Dutch Parliament (‘House 
of representatives’ or ‘Lower House’) voted in favor of government’s plans to deploy its 
military forces to the South of Afghanistan. Out of 150 members of the Second Chamber, 
127 voted in favor and 23 voted against the mission (NRC, February 3, 2006). At the same 
time, a majority of the population opposed the mission, 45 percent was against, 33 percent 
was in favor and 22 percent was neutral (AIV, 2006, p.9). Considering that the Second 
Chamber reflects the opinion of the Dutch population, a difference that large between 
public and parliamentary support is surprising.  
It is understandable that citizens would like to see policy decisions in line with the 
public opinion. The quote of ‘Truus’ (cited in Van der Meulen & Vos, 2012, p.1) at the 
beginning of this thesis illustrates the frustration of someone who feels being played when 
parliament takes a decision that goes against the will of the population. On the other hand, 
it is understandable that politicians make their own decisions regardless of the public 
opinion. This is illustrated by the second quote, where a US State Department official (cited 
in Aldrich, et al., 2006, p.491) argues that he should lead instead of follow the public 
opinion. These conflicting ideas form the background of this research.  
To see how these two views relate to each other and more specifically, how public 
opinion is used by politicians in the decision to deploy a mission to Uruzgan the following 
research question is used: 
 
‘To what extend and how, did politicians use public opinion in the decision to deploy 
a military operation to Uruzgan in 2006, and how can this be explained?’ 
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It is suggested that public opinion did not play a determining role in this decision 
(Voogd & Vos, 2010, p.442; Van der Meulen, 2009, p.136; Van der Meulen & Vos, 2008, 
p.393). However, when opinion polls are compared to the eventual decision, these 
suggestions are not very grounded. Public opinion could be a very important factor in the 
decision making process for the deployment of ‘our boys and girls’ to conflict zones, 
especially after the often discussed Srebrenica debacle where Dutch troops failed to 
protect a United Nations Safe Haven and where 7.000 people died as a result (BBC, 2012). 
After weighting the public opinion carefully, the decision could still be against the opinion 
of the public. To get a clear picture of the underlying mechanism this research was needed.  
Next to an answer to the research question it is expected that the findings of this 
research will shed some light on the broader question of what role public opinion plays in 
the decision making process of political and policymaking elites when it comes to military 
operations, or more generally, in the foreign policy making of the Netherlands. An answer 
to the research question and insight in the broader question is important because without a 
clear understanding of how politicians use public opinion in decisions such as the 
deployment of a mission to Uruzgan, an accurate debate about the desirability of the 
current decision making process is impossible. This research is a good start. However, it is 
not enough to provide a complete answer to the broader question - the role of public 
opinion in foreign policy making – therefore, further research with other methods and 
other cases is recommended. 
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Elite decision making in foreign affairs 
Within the vast amount of literature on elite decision making in foreign policy two 
observations can be distilled relevant for this research. The first observation is the process 
of ‘domesticization’, a process in which domestic actors increasingly influence foreign 
policy. Verbeek & Van der Vleuten (2008) argued that foreign policy makers in the 
Netherlands have become more sensitive to the influence of domestic actors after the Cold 
War due to these four developments: 1) the end of the international bipolarity (United 
States and its allies against Russia and its allies), 2) an increase in the connections of the 
international system (globalization), 3) the growth of international organizations, and 4) the 
increased awareness of foreign policy issues in the domestic arena (Verbeek & Van der 
Vleuten, 2008, p.358). Together, these developments decreased the total possible 
agreements that can be reached in international negotiations with other states (the so 
called ‘win-set’), as a result foreign policy makers have become more sensitive to the 
influence of domestic actors (Verbeek & Van der Vleuten, 2008, p.358).  
The same process is described by Vollaard & Van Willigen (2011). It is argued that 
Dutch foreign policy makers have to deal with the increasing influence of domestic actors, 
such as other ministries, parliaments, companies, pressure groups and non-governmental 
organizations over the last few decades (Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011, p.2). The 
involvement of more actors means that more opinions about the Dutch position in 
international affairs are confronted with each other and therefore, foreign policy makers 
can no longer take public support, or indifference, for granted (Vollaard & Van Willigen, 
2011, p.2). 
The second observation is that Dutch foreign policy making is portrayed as an 
‘elitist process’. This means that only a small group can participate in the making of foreign 
policy, including government, parliament, policymakers, advisory groups and multinationals 
(Van der Windt, 2014, p.1; Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011, p.8). Often, foreign policy is 
shaped according to publications such as ‘Aan het buitenland gehecht’ (2010), of the 
‘Wetenschappelijk Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid’ (WRR), ‘Maatschappij en krijgsmacht’ 
(2006), of the ‘Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken’ (AIV), or publications of 
‘Clingendael’ and ‘The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies’. These advisory groups give 
advice on the best position for the Netherlands in international affairs, regardless of public 
support. Since only a few actors participate in this process, there is a large distance 
between foreign policy and the public (Van der Windt, 2014, p.1). 
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2.2 The role of public opinion 
According to Everts (2000) and Everts & Isernia (2001) western politicians including the 
Dutch, are constrained by the public opinion. It is for instance argued that the Clinton 
Administration did not deploy ground troops to Kossovo because it was afraid of a negative 
public opinion (Everts & Isernia, 2001, p.5). The other way around, it is argued that the 
public can also demand for the deployment of military forces in the form of peace 
operations in case human rights are violated elsewhere (Everts, 2000, p.91). This has 
become easier due to increased communication technology and new types of media (for 
instance: Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, Instagram) which allows the public to follow 
developments in other parts of the world. Therefore, it is argued that governments are 
under ‘constant pressure’ since the public is ‘always involved in war’ (Everts, 2000, p.91). 
To go one step further, it is even argued that politicians would only act according to 
what they understand as ‘public opinion’. Different politicians, for instance André Rouvoet 
(former Member of Parliament and vice-president in the cabinet Balkenende IV) and 
Jacques Tichelaar (former chairman of the PvdA fraction in the Second Chamber) stated 
that politicians too often act according opinion polls (Koop & Van Holsteyn, 2008, p.276). 
Politicians have been accused of following the ‘sense of the day’ (‘waan van de dag’). This 
means that politicians do not make their own judgments, but simply follow the public 
opinion and act accordingly (Koop & Van Holsteyn, 2008, p.276). 
A more moderate view on the role of public opinion in elite decision making is that 
politicians anticipate on future responses of public opinion. This so called ‘latent’ public 
opinion describes how politicians make decisions and take into account how the public 
might react on these decisions (Hutchings, 2003). When politicians shape policy in this way, 
policy outcomes will always be in line with the public opinion. To what extent politicians are 
led by the ‘latent’ public opinion depends primarily on how easily the public can express its 
opinion after a decision (Hutchings, 2003). Generally, elections are the mechanism in which 
the public can express its feelings. By voting for other politicians the incumbent politicians 
might lose their jobs. To prevent this, the public opinion is taken into account before 
decisions are made.  
From another perspective, it is argued by Koop & Van Holsteyn (2008) that 
members of the Dutch Parliament are not sensitive to the public opinion. Instead, 
politicians always form their own opinions and make their own judgments. Just like Edmund 
Burke did in 1774 when, as a representative of Bristol, he closed a shipyard in his own 
district because he thought it was the best option for the whole country. Politicians value 
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arguments coming from public opinion, but their position is not influenced by the public 
opinion as an independent factor (Koop & Van Holsteyn, 2008).  
Politicians can take public opinion into account in a different way than just 
following the ‘sense of the day’.  According to Aldrich et al. (2006) the public influences 
foreign policy via elections. It is argued that the public is able to form coherent opinions 
regarding foreign policy issues and expresses this in its voting behavior (Aldrich et al., 
2006). At the same time, government takes public opinion into account while it shapes 
foreign policy because it does not want to lose votes in the next elections. It is assumed of 
course, that government officials wish to remain in office.   
To go even further, it is argued (often by government itself) that politicians should 
shape public opinion instead of representing it. In the literature the ‘elite cues theory’ suits 
this point of view. A common observation is that a public debate is often the result of a 
political debate, but if there is political consensus the public is likely to share the same view 
(Berinsky, 2006). In this case, public opinion can only influence foreign policy when 
politicians have divergent views. Therefore, it is likely that government wants to create as 
much consensus as possible. Just like a US State Department official replied on the question 
of how he dealt with public opinion: ‘to Hell with public opinion. . . .We should lead not 
follow’ (US State Department official cited in Aldrich et al., 2006, p.491).  
2.3 ‘The’ public opinion 
Within the literature regarding the concepts of ‘public opinion’ different definitions are 
used. A distinction can be made between several groups of definitions (Koop & Van 
Holsteyn, 2008, p.280): 1) public opinion as an aggregate of all individual opinions within 
society, 2) the opinion of the majority, 3) the reflection and outcome of opposing interests, 
4) the opinion displayed in media (so called ‘published opinion’) and 5) public opinion as an 
illusion. In this research it is looked at references politicians made to whatever they thought 
of as ‘public opinion’. Therefore not one single definition of the above is used. In fact, all of 
these definitions might apply. 
 
Box 1. Political decision making procedure for the deployment of military forces 
In the Netherlands government and parliament have to conduct the so called ‘article 100 procedure’ 
in order to use military force in peace operations. This procedure refers to article 100 of the Dutch 
constitution and describes that first government informs parliament about an investigation about 
the feasibility and desirability to use military force, second government informs parliament about 
their decision of contributing, third there is a debate between parliament and government followed 
by an unbinding vote in parliament, fourth government informs the international organization about 
their participation.   
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Box 2. The Dutch mission to Uruzgan 
The mission to Uruzgan was part of the greater peace operation ‘International Support and 
Assistance Force’ (ISAF) in Afghanistan. ISAF started in December 2001 to protect the city and 
surroundings of Kabul. In October 2003 the United Nations Security Council decided expand the ISAF 
mandate to the rest of Afghanistan which would occur in 4 phases (UN resolution 1510, 2003). The 
United States conducted a counter insurgency operation earlier, in October 2001, with the United 
Kingdom, Canada, Australia and Germany under the name ‘Operation Enduring Freedom’ (OEF). The 
Netherlands contributed with its special forces and with maritime and aerospace material to OEF. To 
ISAF The Netherlands contributed from the beginning in 2001 with 220 soldiers and by taking the 
lead command together with Germany in 2003, from February until August (Ministry of Defense, 
2017). From August 1, 2006 until the fall of Cabinet on February 20, 2010 The Netherlands was active 
in the southern province of Uruzgan. During the mission in Uruzgan 25 Dutch soldiers lost their lives 
and the amount of soldiers per rotation varied between 1.200 and 2.000 (Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2016, 
p.2). Therefore, the mission to Uruzgan was the largest Dutch military operation since the Korean 
War (Dimitriu & De Graaf, 2016, p.2). 
 
2.4 Puzzle and expectations  
It is understandable that government makes its own judgments regarding foreign policy 
issues and takes actions that go against public opinion. Government has to form policy that 
is in the best national interest on an international level. Therefore, it can make different 
judgments than the public. For instance, motives for participating in international peace 
operations such as the protection of the international legal order and the protection of 
human rights (Traas, 2012, p.17; Van Veen, 2012, p.17; Van der Lijn, 2017, p.1), or the 
‘prevention’ of terrorism (Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011, p.14; Beeres et al., 2012, p.23; 
Traas, 2012, p.14) are likely to be supported by public as well as by politicians.  However, 
motives such as loyalty to allies and maintaining a good reputation in international 
organizations (Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011, p.14; Beeres et al., 2012, p.28; Traas, 2012, 
p.9) are more likely to be supported by politicians without support of the public. So public 
and government can give different weights to motives to participate in international peace 
operations. 
At the same time, it can be argued that the public is where government is pursuing 
the ‘national interests’ for. When it is looked at how national interest come into existence, 
it has to be noted that the public elects government in the first place. Therefore, it is likely 
that the public shapes national interest at least to some extent. Furthermore, the public is 
subject to government’s policy at the same time. A government can only form policy for its 
own inhabitants, the inhabitants of other states are out of its jurisdiction. So, at least during 
the elections, the public can shape national interests and afterwards it is subject to 
government’s policy regarding the pursue of national interests in international affairs. 
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To see how public opinion is used in the decision making, it has to be looked at the 
parliament. In case of the Dutch participation in the peace operation in Uruzgan, where a 
large difference existed between public and political support, the Second Chamber of the 
Dutch Parliament is the place that should give more insight into this puzzle. Answers should 
be found here because this is the place where government’s plans and the public opinion 
are confronted with each other. The politicians of the Second Chamber decide on policy 
initiatives and form a check on government that makes the balance in power. Besides, the 
politicians of the Second Chamber represent the public.  
Drawing from the literature it can be expected that members the Second Chamber, 
act in two ways: 1) Members of the Second Chamber represent the public in a direct way, 
they refer to ‘public opinion’ to justify their decisions. This is probably the way in which the 
voters of Edmund Burke liked to be represented. 2) Members of the Second Chamber 
represent the public in an indirect way, they only make their own judgments after the 
mandate of the public is gained during elections. This is the way in which Edmund Burke 
himself represented the public of his constituency. Since these two opposing ways of 
representing the public do not have to be mutually exclusive, it is likely that both were 
present during the debate regarding the mission to Uruzgan. So, within the explained 
theories, concepts and ideas this research focuses on the ‘sense of the day’ (direct 
representation) and the idea that politicians always make their own decisions regardless of 
the public opinion (indirect representation), which is shown in table 1.  
 
Table 1. Theories, concepts & ideas 
Way of representing the public (this research): 
1. Sense of the day (Rouvoet, Tichelaar in Koop & Van Holsteyn, 2008) 
2. Representatives make their own decision (Koop & Van Holsteyn, 2008) 
Role of public opinion in foreign policy (related concepts): 
3. Motives for participating in peace operations (Traas, 2012; van der Lijn, 2017; Veen, 2012; Beeres 
et al., 2012; Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011) 
4. Elite cues theory (Berinsky, 2006) 
5. Public influences foreign policy via elections (Aldrich et al., 2006) 
6. Latent public opinion (Hutchings, 2003) 
7. Constant pressure (Everts, 2000; Everts & Isernia, 2001) 
8. Domesticization (Verbeek & Van der Vleuten, 2008; Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011) 
9. Elitist process (Van der Windt, 2014) 
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3. RESEARCH METHODS 
The objective of this research is to see whether and how politicians used public opinion in 
the decision to deploy a mission to Uruzgan in 2006. On a broader level, this research can 
be seen as a study of elite decision making. Within this bigger picture, it focuses on 
politicians within the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament because this is the place 
where government’s plans and public opinion are confronted with each other. Since the 
Second Chamber consists of elected representatives and since parliament forms the check 
in balance on government, this is where the public opinion can be displayed against 
government’s opinion. Therefore, the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament is the arena 
where should be looked at.  
3.1 Approach & Design 
This research is executed in a qualitative way because it is tried to ‘see through the eyes’ of 
the politicians and to explain the underlying mechanisms. To place oneself in someone 
else’s position is an important characteristic of qualitative research, whereas quantitative 
research is characterized by sympathizing as less as possible with the studied objects 
(Bryman, 2012). Besides, a qualitative approach allows the researcher to explain 
mechanisms better than effects, effects can be explained better with quantitative research 
(Bryman, 2012). Even though the distinction between qualitative and quantitative can be 
blurred sometimes (because different research designs can be used within both approaches 
and because a distinction between inductive and deductive research can be difficult in 
reality) (Bryman, 2012), this research can be seen as more qualitative in nature because it 
tries to sympathize as much as possible with the studied objects and because it explains the 
underlying mechanism rather than effects.   
 An in-depth single case study is used in this research. This is appropriate because it 
allows the researcher to study public opinion in the decision making process of politicians in 
as much depth as possible. The strength of an in-depth single case study is its internal 
validity (Bryman, 2012). Internal validity is high when all steps are following logically after 
one another and end with a conclusion that is grounded in the mechanism that is found or 
tested. The weakness of an in-depth single case study is its external validity because 
findings are difficult to generalize to other cases (Bryman, 2012). Therefore, no claims can 
be made about other cases. Instead, the findings of this research will give insight in the 
underlying mechanism which could be relevant for other cases as well. 
The Dutch mission to Uruzgan is selected as the case because of two reasons. First, 
a military operation executed by the Netherlands was practical. It was known where to find 
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the official parliamentary documents and these documents were in the native language of 
the researcher. Besides, it was thought that it would be easier to make contact with former 
members of parliament in the Netherlands than abroad. Second, the mission to Uruzgan 
was chosen because this is the most recent, big peace operation with a substantial threat of 
casualties (Ministry of Defense, 2017). Since this mission was heavily debated, from the 
start until the end (eventually the Cabinet of Balkenende IV fell because of this issue in 
2010), this mission was chosen as the case.  
3.2 Content analysis 
A content analysis is used in this research. Data is collected from official parliamentary 
documents, the so called ‘Kamerstukken’. The period that is been studied starts on June 16, 
2006 when the Second Chamber was informed about government’s intention to deploy a 
mission to Uruzgan. The period that is analyzed ends on February 2, 2006 when the Second 
Chamber voted in favor of the mission. This period is defined by making a reconstruction of 
the debate first (Appendix 1), after which the relevant documents could be traced.  
Data was collected in two rounds. In the first round the ‘Kamerstukken’ were 
searched on the following words: ‘publiek, opinie, steun, gedragen, breed, maatschappelijk, 
samenleving, vertegenwoordigen, draagvlak, bevolking, signalen, signaal, debat, meningen, 
mening, middenveld, Nederlanders’. These words were used to see whether politicians 
made a reference to whatever they understood as ‘public opinion’. In the second round all 
documents were studied thoroughly to see in what context the references were made and 
to see what the debate was about apart from the public opinion. These two rounds were 
used get as much insight as possible on the debate regarding Uruzgan. 
3.3 Questionnaire  
Next to the content analysis a questionnaire of ten questions is used (Box 3) to collect data 
from different members of parliament that were active during the analyzed period. The 
questions were asked to former chairmen of the Second Chamber fractions: Maxime 
Verhagen (CDA), Mathieu Herben (LPF; on the advice of chairman Gerard van As), Boris 
Dittrich (D66), Femke Halsema (GroenLinks), Wouter Bos (PvdA) and Jozias van Aartsen 
(VVD). Answers were received from Maxime Verhagen (CDA), Wouter Bos (PvdA) and 
Mathieu Herben (LPF). Due to practical reasons it was not possible for the others to 
participate.  
The strength of a questionnaire is that the opinion of participants can be asked. This 
is helpful for this research because it is not only tried to see whether and how public 
opinion was used in the decision to go to Uruzgan, but it is also tried to find explanations. 
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To get a better understanding of why politicians used public opinion in the way they did (or 
did not), the questionnaire is an appropriate tool. The weakness of a questionnaire is that 
answers are by definition subjective. Reality however, might have been different than the 
respondents describe.  
 
Box 3. Questionnaire 
 
The following questions were asked and responded by email:  
 
 Hoe is het standpunt van uw partij tot stand gekomen voor de missie in Uruzgan? 
Welke actoren hebben daar een belangrijke rol in gespeeld (experts uit ministeries 
van Defensie of BuZa, partijleiding, Kamercommissies, etc.)? 
 
 Is tijdens de besluitvorming binnen uw partij om deel te nemen aan de missie in 
Uruzgan, op enige manier rekening gehouden met de ‘publieke opinie’? Waarom 
wel of juist niet? Hoe werkt dat? 
 
 Hoe definieert u publieke opinie?  
 
 Hoe is volgens u het Nederlandse volk gerepresenteerd in het besluit om deel te 
nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan?  
 
 Denkt u dat politici (uzelf en uw collega’s in de Tweede Kamer) zich op sommige 
momenten hebben laten leiden door de ‘waan van de dag’, door wat politici 
dachten dat het volk van de missie vond?  
 
 Of, denkt u dat politici het volk in de beslissing om deel te nemen aan de missie in 
Uruzgan alleen op een indirecte manier hebben gerepresenteerd, dat het volk de 
Tweede Kamerleden heeft kunnen kiezen die vervolgens zelf een afweging hebben 
gemaakt om wel of niet deel te nemen?  
 
 Heeft de eigen achterban voor u een rol gespeeld in het besluit om wel of niet deel 
te nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan? Is er in de afweging om een missie in Uruzgan 
te steunen gedacht aan volgende Tweede Kamerverkiezingen en daarmee de 
beoogde kiezers?  
 
 Wordt er in het algemeen, als het gaat om het uitzenden van Nederlandse militairen 
in vredesoperaties, een afweging gemaakt op basis van wat de publieke opinie vindt 
van een missie? Kunt u uitleggen waarom dat volgens u wel of niet gebeurt?  
 
 In de aanloop naar het besluit om deel te nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan op 2 
februari 2006, is de publieke opinie nooit als argument gebruikt in de Tweede 
Kamer om de missie wel of niet te steunen. Hoe is dat volgens u te verklaren?  
 
 Wordt er in de Tweede Kamer niet over publieke opinie gesproken als het gaat om 
de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen of was dat toevallig alleen het geval voor 
de missie in Uruzgan? Wat zou u ervan vinden als een van uw collega’s zijn/haar 
standpunt zou onderbouwen met de mening van het publiek over een militaire 
missie? 
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3.4 Validity & Reliability 
In every scientific research requirements of validity and reliability have to be satisfied. The 
validity (specifically the ‘validity of measurement’) of the content analysis is strong because 
the two rounds of data collection allowed the researcher to filter all possible references to 
public opinion. The first round started with only a few words that could indicate a reference 
to public opinion, but by studying the documents thoroughly it was possible to add more 
words to search for references. This enabled the researcher to see clearly how many times 
and in what context references to public opinion were made. To guarantee the validity of 
the questionnaire is a slightly bigger challenge because it is always difficult to discover 
exactly which factors play a role in a decision making process, partly because respondents 
could not even be aware of this themselves. Still, the validity of the questionnaire is 
sufficient because multiple open questions were asked where the role of public opinion in 
the decision making is asked in several different ways. Therefore, it could be observed 
whether the respondents gave contradicting or similar answers to the questions.   
In terms of reliability this research is sufficient as well. The reliability of the content 
analysis is strong because a reconstruction is made first, so a period could be defined in 
which the publicly available documents could be downloaded from: 
https://zoek.officielebekendmakingen.nl/zoeken/parlementaire_documenten. Therefore, 
replication should be easy. The reliability of the questionnaire is less since only three 
former members of the Second Chamber participated. When all chairmen of the fractions 
at the time analyzed participated, or when other members of the Second Chamber 
participated, another picture could arise. Even though the validity and reliability of the 
questionnaire are less than of the content analysis, the addition of this second method 
makes this research more complete.  
3.5 Triangulation 
Two methods of data collection are used in this research, the content analysis and the 
questionnaire. This strategy was used to check the findings of one method with the findings 
of the other. In other words, triangulation was used. This strategy proved beneficial 
because the two methods explain different parts of the puzzle. The content analysis only 
shows what has been said and written in the official documents, such as minutes of 
debates, letters from government to parliament, motions and other official reports. 
Whereas in the questionnaire personal opinions are observed. The combination of both is 
an appropriate method to place oneself in the position of politicians and to explain 
whether, how and why public opinion is used in the decision to go to Uruzgan.  
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3.6 Limitations 
This research has two limitations. The first limitation is related to the used methods. Even 
though the combination between a content analysis and a questionnaire proved to be a 
good strategy to answer the research question, it is still not enough to explain what really 
happened. The actions and arguments of politicians can be traced in the official 
parliamentary documents and the opinions of politicians can be traced in the answers of 
the questionnaire, however this is not enough to say something about the role public 
opinion played in the decision to go to Uruzgan. For example, politicians can use references 
to public opinion in debates, or politicians can say in the questionnaire that they are not 
influenced by public opinion, this does not necessarily mean that reality is the same. It 
could be that politicians are not always aware of their own decision making process. 
Therefore, this research could only reach conclusions about whether politicians used public 
opinion in a direct way (by using it as an argument in debates) or indirect way (by not 
including public opinion in the justification of party positions) in the decision to go to 
Uruzgan. No conclusions can be reached about the actual weight of public opinion in the 
decision to go to Uruzgan, or about the elite decision making in general. In other words, no 
claims can be made regarding the broader questions.  
The second limitation is related to the use of a single case study. Other cases might 
be different than the decision to deploy a mission to Uruzgan. Research to other Dutch 
military operations, missions executed by other countries or other topics within the policy 
area of Foreign Affairs might have different outcomes. Therefore no claims will be made 
about other cases. 
Therefore, recommendations for further research can be made about the methods 
and about the research design. Combining methods is a good strategy, but to overcome the 
limitations of a content analysis and a questionnaire, in-depth interviews and participative 
observation might be helpful. Recommendations can also be made regarding the research 
design. Different Dutch military operations, other missions executed by other states and 
other topics within the field of Foreign Affairs will show whether the findings of this 
research are generalizable. In short, there is still much to discover. 
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4.  CONTENT ANALYSIS 
The content analysis shows whether and how the members of the Second Chamber used 
public opinion in the decision making process.  
4.1 The data 
A reference to ‘public opinion’ is only made three times in the debate regarding the Dutch 
mission to Uruzgan. The first reference to public opinion was made by Member of 
Parliament of the PvdA, Bert Koenders, during the ‘General Consultation’ (‘Algemeen 
Overleg’) of February 2, 2006. He stated that there is doubt about the mission among the 
public: 
 
‘Dit debat bepaalt de eindafweging van de PvdA-fractie als het gaat om de uiterst 
risicovolle uitzending van Nederlandse militairen naar de provincie Uruzgan. Bij de 
Nederlandse bevolking en in de publieke opinie bestaat twijfel over de missie. De 
discussie heeft door interne verdeeldheid in het kabinet te lang geduurd. Het 
parlement heeft zelf het heft in handen moeten nemen. Het ging ons er steeds om, 
via een uiterst zorgvuldige procedure, via het inzien van rapporten van de 
inlichtingendiensten, via hoorzittingen en briefings met voor-en tegenstanders tot 
een verantwoord eindoordeel te komen.’ Koenders, TK 2005–2006, 27 925 nr. 207, 
p.5. 
 
Koenders’ party, the PvdA, had not given its support to the mission yet. The PvdA 
first wanted to have answers on a couple of matters before it gave its support. The 
statement of public opinion containing doubts strengthened their position to ask questions 
or maybe even to change the mission (TK 2005–2006, 27 925 nr. 207, p.5).  
The other two times when public opinion was used in the argumentation of 
politicians was during the Plenary Debate on February 2, 2006. This was the final debate on 
the mission in Uruzgan. Wouter Bos, chairman of the PvdA fraction, referred to public 
opinion twice. The first time, Bos used ‘public opinion’ when he stated that after a period of 
weighting arguments and struggling with questions where the public was struggling with as 
well, now was the time to decide:   
 
‘Alle leden van de fractie van de Partij van de Arbeid hebben de afgelopen weken 
en maanden wikkend en wegend over het wel of niet verlenen van steun aan de 
missie naar Zuid-Afghanistan, geworsteld met de vragen, twijfels en dilemma’s 
19 
 
waar vele Nederlanders ook mee geworsteld hebben. Vandaag, nu, moeten er 
knopen doorgehakt worden, ook door het kabinet.’ Bos, TK 2005-2006, 45, p.3014. 
 
By now, the PvdA was in favor of the mission. It could be argued that by referring to 
the public that was struggling with questions just like the politicians were, the eventual 
decision would gain weight in the debate. When it is recognized that a certain decision is 
difficult to make, and when it is recognized that the public is struggling with the same 
doubts as politicians, it could be stated that the PvdA was making a well weighted decision.  
The second time Bos referred to the public opinion, he argued that the actual 
question was not whether to deploy a new mission to Uruzgan, but whether to extend the 
already existing contribution to ISAF in Afghanistan. He stated that at the beginning of the 
operation in Afghanistan in 2001 the Netherlands and ‘many groups within society’ 
supported the operation, question is now, according to Bos, whether The Netherlands is 
still supporting the United Nations:  
 
‘Laten wij bijvoorbeeld niet vergeten dat wij ons vanavond niet buigen over de 
vraag of wij aan een operatie in Afghanistan moeten beginnen, maar of wij ermee 
moeten doorgaan. Deze missie heeft een voorgeschiedenis, die begint op 11 
september 2001. Het waren de Amerikanen die getroffen werden door een 
terroristische aanslag. Er ontstond wereldwijd steun, ook in Nederland door grote 
groepen van de bevolking gedragen, om broeinesten van terrorisme in Afghanistan 
op te ruimen en de bestuurders die terroristen steunden op te pakken. Dat was 
geen Amerikaans belang, maar een internationaal belang. Het was geen ideetje van 
Bush, maar het werd gedragen door Kofi Annan. Het waren niet de Verenigde 
Staten, maar de Verenigde Naties. Wij steunden Kofi Annan en de Verenigde Naties 
toen, in 2001. De vraag is vandaag of hij nog steeds op onze steun kan rekenen.’ 
Bos, TK 2005-2006, 45, p.3015. 
 
So, three times a reference was made to public opinion. However, none of these 
references were used as an argument. It was never stated that the public opinion was in 
favor or against the mission, regardless whether this would be true. Even the opposing 
parties, GroenLinks or SP for example, did not use the public opinion as an argument. For 
them it would have been very easy to refer to negative public support for the mission. Yet, 
no reference was made and no questions were asked about public support. GroenLinks did 
ask Parliamentary Questions on the differences in opinion between Ministers Kamp and Bot 
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on October 28, 2005, early in the debate, however not about the public opinion or support 
in society (TK, Handelingen 2005-2006, 15-865).   
Another notable thing is that only members of the PvdA made references to the 
public opinion in their argumentation. Besides, these references were made at the very last 
day of the political debate. Most likely both can be explained by the time that the PvdA 
took a decision to support the mission, which was between the General Consultation and 
the Plenary Debate. It could be argued that because the PvdA did not take position until the 
last day of the debate, it could legitimize its doubts by referring to the doubts in society.  
Rather than public support, political support was an important point of discussion 
in the debates. During the General Consultation of February 2, 2006 it was argued by 
Minister of Foreign Affairs, Ben Bot, that the mission would be deployed only if there would 
be broad political support:  
 
‘Wij winnen uw adviezen in en wij hebben van meet af aan gezegd: als er een breed 
draagvlak is, kwalitatief en kwantitatief, dan gaan wij natuurlijk.’ Bot, TK 2005–
2006, 27 925 nr. 207, p.54. 
 
In addition, Koenders (PvdA) argued that Cabinet had to be united in their support 
for the mission if there would be a broad majority in parliament in favor of the mission: 
 
‘Wij zullen vanavond zien of voor deze missie een breed draagvlak bestaat in de 
Kamer. Mocht dat het geval zijn, dan moeten wij ervan uit kunnen gaan dat het 
besluit van deze Kamer wordt uitgevoerd en dat het dus ook door het kabinet 
wordt uitgedragen.’ Koenders, TK 2005–2006, 27 925 nr. 207, p.71. 
 
Later on, during the final debate, political support was the main focus. It was stated 
that a two-thirds majority in the Second Chamber was needed for the mission (TK 2005-
2006, 45, p.3027). Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende stated that it was decided after the 
Srebrenica debacle, where Dutch troops failed to protect a UN Safe Haven in Bosnia which 
resulted in the death of 7000 people, parliamentary support had to be as much as possible 
for dangerous military operations like the one to Uruzgan (TK 2005-2006, 45, p.3032-3034). 
According to chairman of the D66 fraction, Boris Dittrich, there was a majority in the 
Second Chamber broad enough to deploy the mission (TK 2005-2006, 45, p.3027). During 
this debate politicians tried to convince the parties who were still having doubts to create 
as much political support as possible.   
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One of the reasons for this broad political support in parliament is named Bos 
(PvdA), who argued that it was needed for Cabinet to be united in their decision to deploy a 
mission because if not it could lead to difficult debates when casualties would arise:  
 
‘Als het kabinet ons verantwoordelijk wil maken voor het uitzenden van soldaten 
naar Afghanistan, is dat ook voor het kabinet niet vrijblijvend. Wij gaan er dan van 
uit dat ook het kabinet verantwoordelijkheid neemt en kleur bekent. Daarnaast 
gaan wij ervan uit dat bij een gebleken meerderheid in de Kamer en een 
dientengevolge positief besluit van het kabinet om troepen uit te zenden alle 
ministers dat besluit in de openbaarheid zullen uitdragen en verdedigen. […] Dat is 
geen procedurekwestie, maar het is van groot belang voor de uitgezonden mannen 
en vrouwen. Wij mogen het hen niet aandoen dat het kabinet verdeeld is over deze 
kwestie, want dat zou tot onverkwikkelijke discussies leiden op het moment dat er 
soldaten sneuvelen. Onze uitgezonden mannen en vrouwen moeten zich door alle 
ministers gesteund weten, in goede en in slechte tijden.’ Bos, TK 2005-2006, 45, 
p.3014. 
 
Here, it becomes clear that Bos is aware of the possible mechanism in which a 
public debate could occur as a result of a political debate. When a military operation is 
deployed and Cabinet is not unified in its decision, it could lead to a political debate once 
casualties arise. This could in turn, start a public debate and perhaps a loss of votes or a 
political crisis as consequences. With a unified Cabinet and a broad majority in parliament, 
this risk can be minimalized. Therefore, it was probably argued by Prime Minister 
Balkenende, that society needed a clear sign from government as well as from parliament 
and that the politicians would give their full support to the mission:  
 
‘Wij hebben op het ogenblik behoefte aan een helder signaal van steun vanuit het 
parlement en vanuit de regering voor de mensen die het werk moeten gaan doen. 
Dat is wat er aan de orde is!’ Balkenende, TK 2005-2006, 45, p.3034. 
 
To share the responsibility of the deployment of Dutch soldiers to Uruzgan was an 
important issue during the whole period analyzed. It started with the first notification of 
Minister of Defense, Henk Kamp, to parliament about the possible participation in a new 
mission to the South of Afghanistan on June 16, 2005. This was criticized by members in 
parliament because the announcement was written in a broader report about the NATO 
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meeting of 9 and 10 June 2005 held in Brussels, so it was not a letter containing only the 
notification (TK 2004-2005, 28 676 nr. 22). Later, Parliamentary Questions (‘Kamervragen’) 
were asked by member of the Second Chamber for GroenLinks, Karimi, about the probable 
differences in opinion between Minister of Defense, Kamp, and Minister of Foreign Affairs, 
Bot, regarding the new mission because this was portrayed in a newspaper (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.257). Both Ministers replied with a letter to parliament in which it was stated that 
they were both in favor of the mission (TK 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 189). Then, on 22 
December 2005, when parliament received the article 100 letter (TK 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 
193) parliament was reluctant to review the case because of government’s ‘intention’ 
instead of ‘decision’ to deploy a mission to Uruzgan. It was argued that it is government’s 
job to decide on a mission and parliament’s job to critically asses that decision. By changing 
‘decision’ into ‘intention’ the responsibility of a military mission was placed into the hands 
of parliament. To confirm its plans, cabinet send another letter in which it was stated that 
government ‘decided on the intention’ to deploy a mission to Uruzgan (TK 2005-2006, 27 
925 nr. 195).  
Next to political support, the execution of the mission was heavily discussed. In the 
article 100 letter it was stated that the mission had the purpose of reconstructing 
Afghanistan (TK 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 193). At the same time, it was stated that the 
occurrence of casualties could not be ruled out (TK 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 193). This created 
the debate whether the mission would primarily be a ‘fighting’ or a ‘reconstruction’ mission 
(TK 2005-2006, 45, 3013-3035). To prove that the mission would be a bit of both, Kamp 
(Defense) created a list of 16 specific points (more elaboration in timeline reconstruction 
Appendix 1) that had to be taken care of before Dutch forces would be deployed. For 
example, one of the concerns of parliament was that captives would end up in secret 
detention centers or even in Guantanamo Bay where human rights would be violated (TK 
2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 201, p.41). By drafting this list government increased its chances to 
get parliamentary approval for the mission. 
A clear distinction between ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) was seen 
as the most important issue for the members of parliaments. OEF was seen as a ‘counter 
insurgency’ mission which means that its purpose was ‘to counter terrorists’ (Grandia, 
2015, p.82). ISAF on the other hand, had its emphasize more on reconstruction, like 
government stated in the article 100 letter. For many in parliament a clear distinction 
between the two missions had to be visible for the people in Afghanistan because one of 
the components of ISAF was to win the ‘hearts and minds’ of the Afghan population. To win 
people’s hearts and minds was seen as a necessary condition for reconstruction. Opposing 
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parties GroenLinks, SP and D66, believed that a clear distinction between ISAF and OEF was 
not possible and therefore the mission would not be able to provide the desired 
reconstruction (TK 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 204).  
4.2 Results 
It becomes clear that public opinion is used three times in the debates prior to the decision 
to deploy a mission to Uruzgan. Bert Koenders (Member of the Second Chamber of the 
PvdA) made a reference during the General Consultation on February 2, 2016 and Wouter 
Bos (chairman of the PvdA fraction) made a reference to public opinion twice during the 
Plenary Debate on February 2, 2006 which was the final debate before the decision was 
taken. These references were probably made to justify the doubts of the PvdA because 
public opinion was not used as an argument in favor or against the mission, it was only 
stated that there was doubt amongst the public. Even the opposing parties (GroenLinks and 
SP), did not use the public opinion as an argument against the mission.  
Rather than public support, political support was an important issue in the debates. 
It was tried to get a majority as broad as possible in favor of the mission. The reluctance of 
parliament to review the article 100 letter showed that it was tried to share the 
responsibility of the Dutch troops that would possibly be deployed. Therefore, government 
first had to be unified in its decision to deploy military forces to the South of Afghanistan. 
Otherwise, it would lead to difficult debates when casualties would arise according to Bos.  
The debates were primarily about the military execution of the mission. The most 
debated issue was whether the mission would be more about reconstruction or more about 
fighting the Taliban. Therefore, a clear distinction between ISAF and OEF was needed. The 
parties who opposed the mission thought it was impossible to make such a distinction and 
thought that the mission would therefore not have the desired results.  
In sum, public opinion was not part of the discussions. Debates were about the 
military execution of the mission, a unified decision of government and as much support as 
possible in the Second Chamber.  
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5. QUESTIONNAIRE ANALYSIS 
The questionnaire analysis shows how public opinion was used in the decision to deploy a 
mission to Uruzgan and what the opinion of the respondents was regarding the public 
opinion at that time.  
5.1 The data 
The position of the respondents regarding the mission to Uruzgan is determined by several 
factors. The motives for participating were described by chairman of the CDA fraction, 
Maxime Verhagen and Mathieu Herben (former chairman of the LPF fraction but not at the 
time analyzed) as the ‘preservation of the international legal order’ and the ‘obligations as 
NATO ally’ (Appendix 2 and 4). These motives were seen as the most important points to 
base an opinion upon. The party positions were shaped during party meetings were it was 
looked at support among members for the mission. Bos for example explained that during 
party meetings of the PvdA, the opinions of Afghan refugees were heard who were pro 
intervention (Appendix 2).  
The role of public opinion in the decision making can be described as a fifth wheel 
on a car, it is always there but not used. Verhagen and Bos are clear about this, the public 
elects representatives who make their own decisions in parliament (Appendix 2 and 3). ‘If 
the public is against the participation in peace operations, it should vote otherwise’, stated 
Verhagen (Appendix 2). Verhagen explained that public opinion was not weighted in the 
party position of the CDA, while Bos argued that public opinion is always ‘relevant’ but in 
weighting the position of the PvdA the opinions within the party were seen as more 
important (Appendix 3). The respondents ruled out the possibility that their party acted 
according the ‘sense of the day’. Bos argued that decisions like the one to go to Uruzgan 
belong to the most important and well weighted decisions in Dutch politics (Appendix 3). 
Therefore, politicians would not act according the sense of the day. Verhagen argued that 
the CDA did certainly not act in such a way, but that the PVV and PvdA did during the 
discussion whether to extend the mission or not in 2010 (Appendix 1). Furthermore, 
Verhagen and Bos argued that they did not anticipate on the next elections (Appendix 2 
and 3), which is plausible since the elections were scheduled on May 15, 2007, so there 
were still 15 months to the next elections.  
 It is interesting to see that involving the public opinion in the weighting of a party’s 
position is seen as acting according the sense of the day. Verhagen for example, replied on 
the question what he would think of a colleague that would strengthen its position on the 
mission by using an argument about public opinion, by saying that ‘[t]here are always 
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opportunistic politicians and parties who let their position depend on the sense of the day’ 
(Appendix 2). Besides, acting according the ‘sense of the day’ is seen as problematic. Bos 
replied to the same question by saying that ‘[i]t happens, but then it is called “support in 
society” (‘maatschappelijk draagvlak’) and there is nothing wrong with that’ (Appendix 3). 
So, public opinion is not seen as a credible argument because it is associated with acting 
according the sense of the day. However, according to Bos, ‘support in society’ could be a 
credible argument. Instead, factors such as the preservation of the international legal order 
(Verhagen. Appendix 2), obligations as a NATO member (Verhagen, Appendix 2), 
international reputation (Herben, Appendix 4) are named to be part of a well weighted 
decision. Finally, Herben named that a cost-benefit decision was made inside the LPF 
(Appendix 4).  
 As a final point, the differences in answers from the respondents are remarkable. 
First, regarding the difference in the format of answers has to be noted that Herben did not 
directly answered the questionnaire but wrote down five points which had to be taken into 
account while reading the four attached appendices. Probably this was because of his 
enthusiasm because he already explained some things during a phone call in which the 
researcher only asked whether he would be willing to cooperate. Second, the way in which 
the party positions were shaped is described differently between Bos and Verhagen. 
According to Bos the position of the PvdA is influenced by actors within the party such as 
experts on the topic, refugees, and other stakeholders. While according to Verhagen the 
position of the CDA is influenced during party meetings as well as by external actors such as 
the American and Afghan Embassies. This difference could be only in the explanation of the 
process, or it could be true that the parties were influenced by different actors. With the 
existing data it is difficult to explain this difference. Last but not least, it is remarkable that 
Verhagen is clear about the role of public opinion, it was simply not part of the decision 
making of CDA, while Bos argued that public opinion is always playing a role, but that in 
case of Uruzgan other considerations were more important.   
5.2 Results 
It becomes clear that the most important thing for the respondents was to make a well 
weighted decision. This decision was based on several things. First, the motives for 
participating in the mission were describes as the preservation of the international legal 
order, the obligations forthcoming of NATO membership and the Dutch reputation towards 
allies. Second, the relevant actors that participated in the decision were described as 
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experts within ministries, the Embassies of the US and Afghanistan, experts on the topic 
within the party, and other party members.   
 Public opinion was seen as unimportant for the decision to deploy a mission to 
Uruzgan. Verhagen said it was not used in the position taking of the CDA. Bos said public 
opinion is always present, but in this decision the opinion of the party members were more 
important.  
 To justify a party position by the public opinion is seen as acting according the 
‘sense of the day’. This, in turn, is thought of as undesirable. The respondents said they did 
not act according the sense of the day, however Verhagen accused the PVV and PvdA of 
acting according the sense of the day in 2010 when Cabinet fell. Furthermore, it was stated 
that the next elections were not taken into account when the respondents made their 
decision regarding Uruzgan.  
 Finally it was explained that the public could vote for its representatives in 
parliament, so if it did not agree with the decision to deploy the mission it should have 
voted otherwise. In other words, public opinion is not seen as an important factor in the 
decision making process because it is associated with acting like the sense of the day. The 
public votes and the politicians take the decisions.  
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6. CONCLUSION 
6.1 Research question & expectations 
When the Dutch Second Chamber of Parliament decided to deploy a mission to Uruzgan on 
February 2, 2006 there was a broad majority that gave its support. The majority of the 
public however, opposed the mission (AIV, 2006, p.9). Considering that the Second 
Chamber represents the public, this difference between parliamentary and public support is 
remarkable. On the one hand, government pursues national interests even when the public 
does not support its actions. On the other hand, it raises questions when the public has 
such a strong different opinion. To see how the public is represented in this decision the 
following research question is used:  
 
‘To what extend and how did politicians use public opinion in the decision to deploy 
the mission to Uruzgan in 2006, and how can this be explained?’ 
 
It was expected that the Members of the Second Chamber could act in two ways: 1) 
they could represent the public in a direct way by referring to public opinion to justify their 
decisions, or 2) they could represent the public in an indirect way by making their own 
judgments regardless of public opinion. 
6.2 Conclusions 
The results of this research support the second expectation, the Members of the Second 
Chamber of the Dutch Parliament represented the public in an indirect way in the decision 
to deploy a military operation to Uruzgan. Public opinion is not used to justify party 
positions in the debates. It was seen as important to make a well weighted decision and the 
public opinion was named as an unimportant factor for this decision. To include the public 
opinion in the decision to go to Uruzgan was seen as acting according the sense of the day 
which is described as undesirable. Rather than public support, parliamentary support was 
an important factor in the decision making. It was tried to find a majority as broad as 
possible in the Second Chamber. The public could influence the composition of the Second 
Chamber during the elections. People could vote for their representatives in parliament. So 
the way in which the public could influence the decision was via elections.  
To answer the research question, three things can be said. First, Koenders (PvdA) 
used public opinion once and Bos (PvdA) used public opinion twice in the debates prior to 
the decision to go to Uruzgan. These three references were probably made to justify the 
party’s doubts on the mission which lasted until the Plenary Debate on February 2, 2006. It 
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was argued that there was doubt amongst the public. Second, public opinion was seen as 
an unimportant factor in the decision making process. Other factors were seen as more 
credible to base an opinion on, such as whether or not the mission would contribute to the 
preservation of the international legal order, the international reputation of The 
Netherlands and the obligations forthcoming of NATO membership. Therefore, it could be 
said that public opinion was used as a spare wheel on a car.  It was present, but nothing 
was done with it. Third, this can be explained by the way in which politicians view the use of 
public opinion in justifying their party positions. The use of public opinion for defending an 
opinion is associated with acting like the sense of the day. In turn, acting like the sense of 
the day and making a well weighted decision are seen as mutually exclusive. The members 
of the Second Chamber see their role as representatives that have to make their own 
decisions regardless of the public opinion. The party positions are shaped by the party 
members during party meetings and the politicians represent this position in parliament. In 
other words, the opinion of the party is considered to be the most important factor in the 
decision making process of politicians.  
The combination of the content analysis and the questionnaire proved to be 
beneficial because the same conclusions are reached which gives more certainty about the 
conclusions. Besides, both methods can explain a different part of the puzzle. The content 
analysis explains what the debates were about and what has been said literally, while the 
questionnaire explains what the respondents thought about what has been said. In sum, 
the use of both methods enriched this research.  
6.3 Discussion 
Next to an answer to the research question this research gives some insight into related 
and broader concepts as well. To some degree, support can be found for the stated motives 
of participation in peace operations (for instance: Traas; van der Lijn, Veen, Beeres, Vollaard & 
Van Willigen),  the mechanism of public influence on foreign policy making via elections (for 
instance Aldrich et a.) and the mechanism of latent public opinion (for instance Hutchings). 
For the elite cues theory support can be found to a lesser extent and no support can be 
found for the constant pressure (for instance Everts, 2000; Everts & Isernia, 2001). 
However, as shown in table 1, these things can be said with moderate certainty since this 
research only focused on the first two concepts: the sense of the day and the 
representatives that make their own decisions.  
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Table 2. Findings related to the literature 
Theories, concepts, ideas Content 
analysis 
Questionnaire Certainty  
Way of representing the public (researched):   Green 
(strong) 
1. Sense of the day (Rouvoet, Tichelaar in Koop & Van 
Holsteyn, 2008) 
- -  
2. Representatives make their own decision (Koop & Van 
Holsteyn, 2008) 
+ +  
Role of public opinion in foreign policy (related concepts):   Yellow 
(moderate) 
3. Motives for participating in peace operations (Traas, 
2012; van der Lijn, 2017; Veen, 2012; Beeres et al., 2012; 
Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011) 
+   
4. Elite cues theory (Berinsky, 2006)    
5. Public influences foreign policy via elections (Aldrich et 
al., 2006) 
 +  
6. Latent public opinion (Hutchings, 2003) +   
7. Constant pressure (Everts, 2000; Everts & Isernia, 
2001) 
- -  
Elite decision making in foreign affairs (the difficult 
questions): 
  Red  
(weak) 
8. Domesticization (Verbeek & Van der Vleuten, 2008; 
Vollaard & Van Willigen, 2011) 
   
9. Elitist process (Van der Windt, 2014) + +  
 
To most interesting questions are at the same time the most difficult. It was not 
possible to see what weight public opinion really had in the decision to deploy a mission to 
Uruzgan in 2006 because it could not be looked inside the heads of politicians. Besides, 
whether or not Dutch foreign policy making can be better described as an elitist process, or 
as domesticization remains unclear. Therefore, recommendations are made about further 
research. Even so, is the question left for others to argue whether the decision making 
process of Dutch foreign policy is the most desirable.  
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8. APPENDIX 1. Timeline Reconstruction 
13-10-2003 UN Security Council votes for an extension of the mandate of the 
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) to the rest of Afghanistan. (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.251). Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 27 925 nr. 177. 
 
*Until this moment, ISAF was only present in Kabul, however with this mandate it could 
expand its operations to the rest of Afghanistan. This was done in four stages: 1) To the 
north, 2) to the west, 3) to the south where Uruzgan is located and 4) to the east (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.251). 
10-01-2005 Canada presents its idea to establish a Provincial Reconstruction Team 
(PRT) in the southern province of Kandahar during a meeting of the Stuurgroep Militaire 
Operaties (SMO) (Hazelbag, 2009, p.251). 
 
*The Steering Group Military Operations is working group where the ministries of General 
Affairs, Defense and Foreign Affairs work together on a weekly basis. Because the 
Netherlands had a good experience with its PRT in the north of Afghanistan it was 
considering to establish a second one (Hazelbag, 2009, p.251). 
 
20-01-2005 First contacts between the Netherlands and Canada take place (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.252).  
 
10-02-2005 Director of Operation of the defense Staff reports to the SMO that a 
meeting took place with the United Kingdom and Canada about ISAF stage 3 in southern 
Afghanistan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.252).  
 
* The Netherlands, the United Kingdom and Canada were investigating the possibility to 
deploy a combined mission to the south of Afghanistan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.252). 
 
Spring 2005  The Netherlands decides to not extend the mission ‘Stabilization Force Iraq’ 
(SFIR) (Hazelbag, 2009, p.252).  
 
* Within the Ministry of Foreign Affairs questions were raised about whether it would be 
smart to announce its plans to deploy a mission to Afghanistan after it just ended this 
mission in Iraq. At the same time, it was thought of the political consequences of not 
participating in Afghanistan, especially the Dutch relations with the United States, the 
United Kingdom and within NATO (Hazelbag, 2009, p.252).  
 
03-05-2005 Prime Minister Balkenende, Minister Kamp (Defense) and Minister Bot 
(Foreign Affairs) attend a briefing at the Ministry of Defense about the state of affairs in 
Afghanistan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.254). 
 
24-05-2005 Meeting of Kamp, Bot and civil servants on the possibility of a mission to 
southern Afghanistan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.254). 
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* It was agreed that the ministries would continue with the preparations of the mission. 
Besides, it was decided that Minister Bot would look whether the D66 and the PvdA would 
support the mission to Uruzgan. This was needed because in the earlier mission in 
Afghanistan, OEF, the PvdA was against the mission. To prevent this from happening again 
the opposition parties were sounded out. Both D66 and PvdA were now likely to support 
the new mission (Hazelbag, 2009, p.254). 
 
14-06-2005 A team of Defense and Foreign Affairs officials went to Afghanistan on a 
Fact-Finding Mission to determine in which province the Netherlands wanted and could 
participate (Hazelbag, 2009, p.254). 
 
!16-06-2005 Parliaments is informed for the first time about the plans of government to 
extend its participation in ISAF to the south of Afghanistan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.255). 
Analysis starts at this date! 
Kamerstukken II 2004-2005, 28 676 nr. 22.  
 
* Minister Kamp send a letter to parliament, also on behalf of Minister Bot in which it was 
stated that after a request of the NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer, it was 
announced that the Netherlands was going to investigate a possible mission to the south of 
Afghanistan in cooperation with the United Kingdom and Canada (Hazelbag, 2009, p.255).  
 
End of September 2005  Prime Minister Balkenende,  Minister Bot and Minister 
Kamp decide and let the NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer know that the 
Netherlands will participate in the extension of ISAF to the province of Uruzgan. At least, if 
parliament approves the plan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.256).  
 
19-10-2005 ‘Militaire Inlichtingen en Veiligheidsdienst’ (MIVD, ‘The Military Intelligence 
and Security Service’) releases a very critical report about the possible mission to Uruzgan 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.256). 
 
18-10-2005 – 20-10-2005  A group of civil servants and directors of the Ministries of 
Defense and Foreign Affairs visit Afghanistan in which Australia says that it would be 
impossible to win people’s hearts and minds in Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.256). 
 
27-10-2005 ‘Commandant der Strijdkrachten’ (CDS, ‘Commander in Chief’) presents his 
military advice to the Minister of Defense, he describes the mission as challenging but 
feasible (Hazelbag, 2009, p.256).  
 
28-10-2005 A newspaper states that Minister Kamp and Both have different opinions 
about the mission to Uruzgan, as a result ‘Kamervragen’ (‘Parliamentary questions’) were 
raised (Hazelbag, 2009, p.257).  
Kamerstukken II, 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 189. 
 
* Member of the Second Chamber Karimi of GroenLinks asked parliamentary questions on 
the differences in opinion between Kamp and Bot after which both Ministers send a letter 
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to parliament in which they assured the members of parliament of their shared opinion 
regarding the mission to Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.257).  
31-10-2005 – 02-11-2005 Minister Kamp visits the Dutch special force in the north of 
Afghanistan and he attends a briefing of the Americans. This results in a list of 16 points 
that need to be taken care off to get parliamentary support (Hazelbag, 2009, p.258).  
 
* These 16 points were all technical things about the mission including:  
‘[T]he retention of a US contingent in the northern part of Uruzgan at the bases 
Anaconda in Kaz Uruzgan and Cobra in Shahidi Hassas; the retention of a US 
military contingent of at least battle group size and one PRT in Zabul (province 
southeast of Uruzgan); financing of Kandahar Airfield by NATO instead of the 
participating countries; enough budget to finance reconstruction projects; back up 
of NATO forces if the Netherlands needs more troops in Uruzgan; the continuing 
involvement of the US in the reconstruction of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and 
the Afghan National Police (ANP) in Uruzgan; good governance of the Afghan 
government and a functioning ANP from the beginning of the mission for the Dutch 
mission to build on; provisions by Afghan government which allow a responsible 
transfer of prisoners to Afghanistan and the matter of the special forces in 
Kandahar.’ (Hazelbag, 2009, p.273).  
 
14-11-2005 Minister Bot meets the Afghan President Karzai in Vienna. At this meeting, 
Karzai makes several concessions including the proper treatment of prisoners and the 
strengthening of the Afghan police and army in the region Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.259).  
 
23/24-11-2005 Van Baalen, VVD Foreign Affairs parliamentary spokesman proposes a 
motion in which government was asked to investigate the possibility that the whole mission 
ISAF will be executed with respect to international law and inform parliament about this. 
He is critical about the human rights violations in Afghanistan and states that the VVD will 
not support a mission that is not respecting the international rule of law (Hazelbag, 2009, 
p.259). 
 
*Minister Bot responded by saying that he is negotiating Memoranda of Understanding 
(MUOs) with President Karzai about the treatment of prisoners and the death penalty 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.259). 
At the same time, NATO Secretary General De Hoop Scheffer said that the Netherlands 
should make haste with its decision to participate in Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.259). 
 
30-11-2005 Minister Bot experiences pressure from the US by meeting the two Under 
Secretaries Florey (Defense) and Fried (State, ‘Buitenlandse Zaken’) to discuss the mission 
to Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.259). 
 
02-12-2005 Discussion in the Council of Ministers takes place and is put on the agenda 
for the Council of Ministers of 9 December (Hazelbag, 2009, p.259). 
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08-12-2005 Minister Bot says he feels comfortable with the protection of Dutch soldiers 
and the treatment of prisoners as well as defending the mission in government (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.260). 
  
09-12-2005 CDS presents the mission in the Council of Ministers, supported by Kamp 
and Bot. No decision is reached because of criticism, by Minister Pechtold. The council will 
discuss the mission again in 19 December (Hazelbag, 2009, p.260-161). 
16-12-2005 D66 is briefed by the CDS and Castelijn, the Director of General Policy 
Affairs of the Ministry of Defense. After the briefing party leader Dittrich states on 
television that D66 will not support a mission to Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.274). So, this is 
even before the official article 100 letter! 
 
* This statement was result of a struggle for power within D66 and caused a problem for 
cabinet with two ministers of the party D66, Pechtold and Brinkhorst. At this stage, the 
Netherlands got some concessions of other allies who would need a serious explanation if 
the mission would not happen. At the same time, it would be a problem within D66 when 
the two Ministers would support the mission while the rest of the party would oppose it 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.261).   
 
19-12-2005 Because Minister Brinkhorst was still on a working trip to Hong Kong 
Cabinet cannot take a decision on the matter of Uruzgan. Therefore, the mission is placed 
on the agenda for December 22 (Hazelbag, 2009, p.262). 
 
21-12-2005 Ministers Kamp, Bot, Pechtold and Brinkhorst meet in Brinkhorst’s office. 
Bot suggests that they replace ‘decision’ by ‘intention’ in the article 100 letter to get the 
support of the Ministers of D66 (Hazelbag, 2009, p.262).   
 
22-12-2005 Council of Ministers decides to send the article 100 letter to parliament 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.262). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 194.  
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 193. 
 
* Parliament was reluctant to review the article 100 letter because of governments 
‘intention’ instead of decision to deploy a mission to Uruzgan. It was argued that it is 
government’s job to decide on a mission and parliament’s job to critically asses the 
decision. By changing the article 100 letter into ‘intention’ the responsibility of a military 
mission was placed in hands of parliament. As a result, cabinet send another letter in which 
it was stated that government decided on the intention to deploy a mission to Uruzgan 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.263). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 195 
 
13-01-2006 Ministers Kamp and Bot send a letter to parliament again to assure that 
they took a decision for the mission to Uruzgan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.263).  
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 197.  
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17-01-2006 Kamp states that MIVD report cannot be send to parliament, instead 
parliament can be briefed about Uruzgan by the CDS and the MIVD Director (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.264). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 198. 
 
25-01-2006 Minister Kamp allows the Second Chamber to read the MIVD report, but 
parts were blacked out (Hazelbag, 2009, p.264).  
 
26-01-2006 The CDS and the MICD Director give a confidential meeting in presence of 
Minister Kamp, to the Permanent Commission of Foreign Affairs (Hazelbag, 2009, p.264).   
30-01-2006  The slides of the confidential meeting are send to the Second Chamber 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.264). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 200. 
 
* The procedure of the decision to go to Uruzgan was subject to discussion as well as the 
content of the decision because for parliament it was not very clear whether the 
Netherlands would predominately fight the Taliban or whether it would take actions for 
reconstruction and development. However, a peace operation cannot be assigned to one of 
these extremes because it incorporates both. The reason for this debate was that the 
article 100 letter of December 22, 2005 stated that the mission had the purpose of bringing 
stability and reconstruction, but that at the same time the occurrence of casualties could 
not be ruled out, so the mission was already expected to become dangerous. This led to a 
discussion whether it would be a ‘fighting mission’ or a ‘reconstruction mission’ (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.264-265). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 193. 
 
30-01-2006 The public hearing takes place. From 08:30 until 22:00 the MPs could 
question experts + UN Secretary general Kofi Annan visits the Netherlands. 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 201.  
 
* The Ministers of Defense, Foreign Affairs and Development Cooperation thought that a 
public hearing could take away the doubts among PvdA members and that it could increase 
support in society. At the same day, Secretary General of the UN Kofi Anan stated that he 
was hoping that the Dutch parliament would take the right decision towards Uruzgan. 
Besides Australia announced that it would send a reconstruction force to Afghanistan. This 
was yet another impulse for Dutch politicians because the Netherlands could cooperate 
with Australia in Afghanistan (Hazelbag, 2009, p.266).  
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 193. 
 
01-02-2006 A confidential briefing is given on the Rules of Engagement to the 
Permanent Commissions for Foreign Affairs and Defense.  
 
!02-02-2006 Parliament approves Cabinet decision to deploy a mission to Uruzgan 
(Hazelbag, 2009, p.251).  
The analysis stops at this date! 
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Kamerstukken II, Handelingen 2005-2006, 45-3035 
 
Coalition party D66 and opposition parties GroenLinks and SP and PvdA MP Van Heteren 
voted against, all the other MPs (127 out of 150) voted in favor of the mission. 
First the General Consultation (‘Algemeen Overleg’) was held in which the Permanent 
Commissions of Foreign Affairs, Defense and Overseas Development could debate with the 
ministers in two rounds.  Afterwards the plenary debate took place with all members of the 
Second Chamber.  
In the first term, it became clear that CDA supported the mission because it wanted to bring 
reconstruction to Afghanistan. The PvdA looked like to support the mission after several 
conditions were met, for instance a clear separation between OEF and ISAF. The VVD 
supported the mission as well because earlier doubts about the treatment of prisoners 
(Motion Van Baalen) were taken away during the confidential briefing of the MIVD Director 
and the CDS. The SP was against the mission because it thought Dutch forces would not be 
able to reconstruct the province of Uruzgan since the security risks were too high. D66 had 
to stick with its party leader’s announcement that it would not support a mission to 
Uruzgan, so it did not give its support. The LPF initially supported a mission of only one year 
because it thought a one-year mission would be in line with the ability of the Dutch forces, 
in the end however the LPF gave its support for the two years. Smaller parties like the CU, 
SGP, Groep Wilders and Groep Nawijn said they would support the mission (Hazelbag, 
2009, p.251). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925, nr. 207. 
 
Within the time between the General Consultation and the plenary debate the PvdA met to 
determine their standpoint. The other parties already did this on January 31, but the PvdA 
still did not decide. During this meeting party leader Bos and spokesman Koenders 
convinced the other members to support the mission. So, during the plenary debate the 
PvdA voted in favor of the mission. The CDA, VVD, LPF voted in favor as well. This created 
enough support (127 members out of 150) that the opposition of SP, GroenLinks and D66 
did not matter (Hazelbag, 2009, p.251). 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 27 925 nr. 204.  
Kamerstukken II, Handelingen 2005-2006, 45-3013-3035.  
 
03-02-2006 The decision to deploy a mission to Uruzgan is confirmed in the meeting of 
Cabinet (Hazelbag, 2009, p.251). 
 
01-08-2006 The mission in Uruzgan starts.  
 
Documents that are observed but not present in the timeline: 
Kamerstukken II 2005-2006, 30 162 nrs. 2-3 
Kamerstukken II 2000-2001, 26 454 nr. 11 
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9. APPENDIX 2. Answers Maxime Verhagen (CDA) 
Answers received at May 30, 2017, by Maxime Verhagen. 
 Hoe is het standpunt van uw partij tot stand gekomen voor de missie in Uruzgan? 
Welke actoren hebben daar een belangrijke rol in gespeeld (experts uit ministeries 
van Defensie of BuZa, partijleiding, Kamercommissies, etc.)? 
Met experts uit ministeries van Defensie en Binnenlandse Zaken; minister van 
Buitenlandse Zaken; Amerikaanse Ambassade; Ambassade Afghanistan en 
partijbijeenkomsten 
 
 Is tijdens de besluitvorming binnen uw partij om deel te nemen aan de missie in 
Uruzgan, op enige manier rekening gehouden met de ‘publieke opinie’? Waarom 
wel of juist niet? Hoe werkt dat? 
Neen, in verkiezingsprogramma staat dat we deelnemen aan NAVO en VN-
operaties van groot belang achten. 
 
 Hoe definieert u publieke opinie?  
Opvattingen van de Nederlandse bevolking kenbaar volgens opiniepeilingen en 
eigen reacties. 
 
 Hoe is volgens u het Nederlandse volk gerepresenteerd in het besluit om deel te 
nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan?  
Door stem op partijen die deelnamen aan VN- en NAVO missies voorstaan. 
 
 Denkt u dat politici (uzelf en uw collega’s in de Tweede Kamer) zich op sommige 
momenten hebben laten leiden door de ‘waan van de dag’, door wat politici 
dachten dat het volk van de missie vond? 
Neen, CDA niet, maar PVV wel en PvdA in 2010 ook. 
 
 Of, denkt u dat politici het volk in de beslissing om deel te nemen aan de missie in 
Uruzgan alleen op een indirecte manier hebben gerepresenteerd, dat het volk de 
Tweede Kamerleden heeft kunnen kiezen die vervolgens zelf een afweging hebben 
gemaakt om wel of niet deel te nemen?  
Ja. 
 
 
 Heeft de eigen achterban voor u een rol gespeeld in het besluit om wel of niet deel 
te nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan? Is er in de afweging om een missie in Uruzgan 
te steunen gedacht aan volgende Tweede Kamerverkiezingen en daarmee de 
beoogde kiezers? 
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1. Ja -> via partijbijeenkomsten voor draagvlak gezorgd. 
2. Neen. 
 
 In de aanloop naar het besluit om deel te nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan op 2 
februari 2006, is de publieke opinie nooit als argument gebruikt in de Tweede 
Kamer om de missie wel of niet te steunen. Hoe is dat volgens u te verklaren?  
Omdat dat geen bepalend argument was. 
 
 Wordt er in het algemeen, als het gaat om het uitzenden van Nederlandse 
militairen in vredesoperaties, een afweging gemaakt op basis van wat de publieke 
opinie vindt van een missie? Kunt u uitleggen waarom dat volgens u wel of niet 
gebeurt?  
Neen, maar wel t.a.v. voorwaarden waaronder militairen worden uitgezonden. 
Uitzondering PvdA die Kabinet Balkenende IV ten val bracht door tegen verlenging 
Afhanistan te zijn om electorale redenen. 
 
 Wordt er in de Tweede Kamer niet over publieke opinie gesproken als het gaat om 
de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen of was dat toevallig alleen het geval voor 
de missie in Uruzgan? Wat zou u ervan vinden als een van uw collega’s zijn/haar 
standpunt zou onderbouwen met de mening van het publiek over een militaire 
missie?  
1.  Gaat om principiële keuzes, waaronder handhaven internationale 
rechtsorde en bondgenootschappelijke verplichtingen. Als publiek tegen uitzending 
is moet men op andere partijen stemmen. 
2. Er zijn altijd opportunistische politici/partijen die hun standpunt laten 
afhangen van de waan van de dag. 
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10. APPENDIX 3.  Answers Wouter Bos (PvdA) 
Answers received at June 7, 2017, by Wouter Bos. 
 Hoe is het standpunt van uw partij tot stand gekomen voor de missie in Uruzgan? 
Welke actoren hebben daar een belangrijke rol in gespeeld (experts uit ministeries 
van Defensie of BuZa, partijleiding, Kamercommissies, etc.)?  
Onze partij was steeds verdeeld over dit vraagstuk, zowel toen we naar Afghanistan 
gingen als toen er wel of niet verlengd moest worden. Binnen de partij barstte het 
van experts en betrokkenen, die konden allemaal hun zegje doen op 
bijeenkomsten. Interessant was de rol van gevlucht Afghanen in die debatten, die 
waren fel voor interventie. 
 
 Is tijdens de besluitvorming binnen uw partij om deel te nemen aan de missie in 
Uruzgan, op enige manier rekening gehouden met de ‘publieke opinie’? Waarom 
wel of juist niet? Hoe werkt dat?  
De publieke opinie is altijd relevant maar de meningen binnen de partij zijn soms 
nog belangrijker. Zo ging dat ook in 2006. 
 
 Hoe definieert u publieke opinie?  
Het geheel aan diffuse en multi interpretabele geluiden en standpunten zoals dat 
via media tot je komt. 
 
 Hoe is volgens u het Nederlandse volk gerepresenteerd in het besluit om deel te 
nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan?   
Via hun vertegenwoordigers in het parlement. 
 
 Denkt u dat politici (uzelf en uw collega’s in de Tweede Kamer) zich op sommige 
momenten hebben laten leiden door de ‘waan van de dag’, door wat politici 
dachten dat het volk van de missie vond?  
Nee. Dit soort beslissingen behoren tot de meest intensief bediscussieerde 
beslissingen in de politiek 
 
 Of, denkt u dat politici het volk in de beslissing om deel te nemen aan de missie in 
Uruzgan alleen op een indirecte manier hebben gerepresenteerd, dat het volk de 
Tweede Kamerleden heeft kunnen kiezen die vervolgens zelf een afweging hebben 
gemaakt om wel of niet deel te nemen?  
Ja maar ze houden altijd rekening met de achterban en dat is normaal, niet meteen 
“waan van de dag”. 
 
 Heeft de eigen achterban voor u een rol gespeeld in het besluit om wel of niet deel 
te nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan? Is er in de afweging om een missie in Uruzgan 
te steunen gedacht aan volgende Tweede Kamerverkiezingen en daarmee de 
beoogde kiezers? 
Ja eigen achterban, nee volgende verkiezingen. 
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 Wordt er in het algemeen, als het gaat om het uitzenden van Nederlandse 
militairen in vredesoperaties, een afweging gemaakt op basis van wat de publieke 
opinie vindt van een missie? Kunt u uitleggen waarom dat volgens u wel of niet 
gebeurt?  
Publieke opinie speelt altijd een rol, missies zonder draagvlak zijn kwetsbaar met 
name zogauw er slachtoffers vallen. Maar nogmaals, deze discussies over dit soort 
besluiten behoren bij de meest intensieve en zorgvuldige. 
 
 In de aanloop naar het besluit om deel te nemen aan de missie in Uruzgan op 2 
februari 2006, is de publieke opinie nooit als argument gebruikt in de Tweede 
Kamer om de missie wel of niet te steunen. Hoe is dat volgens u te verklaren?  
Publieke opinie misschien niet maar draagvlak in partij en samenleving wel. Zoek de 
verschillen. 
 
 Wordt er in de Tweede Kamer niet over publieke opinie gesproken als het gaat om 
de uitzending van Nederlandse militairen of was dat toevallig alleen het geval voor 
de missie in Uruzgan? Wat zou u ervan vinden als een van uw collega’s zijn/haar 
standpunt zou onderbouwen met de mening van het publiek over een militaire 
missie?  
Het gebeurt wel maar dan heet het maatschappelijk draagvlak en daar is niets mis 
mee. 
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11. APPENDIX 4. Answers Mathieu Herben (LPF) 
Answers received on June 9, 2017, by Mathieu Herben. 
 
 
Beste Pieter, 
  
We zitten allebei in tijdnood, daarom mail ik je de originele teksten uit 2005 en een 
toespraak tot het LPF-partijcongres. Daaruit kun je veel info halen. 
  
Als je het leest, moet je het volgende in gedachten houden: 
  
1.   Er kwam een wederopbouwmissie in Afghanistan door de NAVO op verzoek van de 
Duitsers, de rood-groene coalitie van SPD en De Groenen. Niet op verzoek van de 
Amerikanen. De Groenen wilden laten zien dat een vredesmacht anders kon optreden dan 
het Amerikaanse leger dat in hun ogen teveel geweld gebruikte. In Nederland steunde 
GroenLinks de missie. Wij werdeb dus rechts ingehaald door GroenLinks. 
 
2.   De LPF vond de missie helemaal niet kosten-effectief: teveel geld en inspanning voor 
een provincie met 350.000 inwoners. Afrika was volgens ons veel belangrijker. 
 
3.   Uiteindelijk gingen wij akkoord met maximaal twee jaar, mits ook islamitische en 
Aziatische landen troepen zouden leveren. Is nauwelijks gebeurd. Daarom schreef ik in 
2007 een artikel in dagblad Trouw tegen verlenging (zie bijlage). 
 
4.   Een lid van de Tweede Kamer controleert de regering. Er is een uitdrukking: de regering 
regeert, het parlement controleert. Het is de plicht van de regering de Kamer juist te 
informeren. Dat hoort ook de voornaamste informatiebron voor een Kamerlid te zijn. De 
publieke opinie is lastig te definiëren en mag zeker niet worden gelijkgesteld aan de 
berichtgeving door de kranten. Met name invloedrijke kranten als De Volkskrant en de NRC 
spelen graag politieke spelletjes. Hun mening deed voor mij niet ter zake. Bovendien ben ik 
zelf defensiespecialist, dus ik heb alleen behoefte aan officiële informatie en geverifieerde 
feiten, niet aan meninkjes van journalisten. Ik heb 23 jaar gewerkt bij Defensie o.a. als 
hoofdredacteur bij de Directie Voorlichting. 
 
5.   De LPF is nooit voorstander geweest, wij zijn slechts akkoord gegaan met een passende 
bijdrage voor een beperkte tijd, omdat iedere bondgenoot een bijdrage moet leveren. Ik 
denk dat het voor veel mensen een eye-opener is dat de NAVO in Afghanistan is verzeild 
door GroenLinks (op verzoek van de Duitsers). 
  
Succes, 
  
Vr.gr. 
  
Mat Herben 
